Authority
Issued: March 2026 Kirstin Hall, MS, BCBA, IBA — Private Practice, San Diego CA Named author. Others contributing have chosen to remain anonymous pending field response.

ABA Accountability Project · August 2026

Who authorized them
to speak for our field?

A trade association representing autism service organizations has spent more than a decade positioning itself as the authoritative voice of the broader autism provider community — setting standards, owning accreditation, lobbying payers, and acquiring data infrastructure. Trade associations are normal and legitimate. The accountability question is different: CASP represents member businesses, yet its authority is increasingly treated as though it represents individual clinicians, nonmember providers, researchers, and the field itself — constituencies that never elected or authorized it to speak for them.

The window to contest it is open. It will not stay open.

View Documents & Downloads Endorse It

Updated August 2026 — Expanded with payer-accountability work, the CMS Medicaid/CHIP ABA Toolkit analysis, and an outcomes-measurement workstream. View All Documents →

2-minute overview: what this is about

  • CASP is a 501(c)(6) trade association representing provider organizations. That status is not itself a criticism; trade associations are a normal part of professional fields, and APBA is also organized under 501(c)(6). The distinction that matters is who the association represents. CASP's members are autism service businesses and organizations. Its advocacy therefore represents the interests of those member organizations — not automatically the individual clinicians, technicians, researchers, families, or nonmember providers who make up the broader autism services field.
  • It was not elected or authorized to represent the field. Ten leaders from provider agencies convened privately in 2009. No nomination process occurred. No practitioners outside the founding group were asked to vote on CASP's authority.
  • Its board is composed entirely of executives of its own member organizations — whose organizations are directly affected by the standards, accreditation requirements, and reimbursement policies CASP develops and lobbies for.
  • It owns the accreditation bodies it lobbies payers to require. The Autism Commission on Quality (ACQ) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CASP. CASP acquired a second accreditation program (BHCOE) and a national patient data registry in December 2025.
  • Its standards and policies carry direct financial implications for the companies whose executives govern it — creating structural conflicts of interest at every level of its decision-making.

This site presents documented information for independent review. All sources are cited in the full position statement.

View Documents & Downloads →

Updated August 2026 — View All Documents →

Key questions to ask

  • Who authorized this organization to represent the ABA services field — and to whom is it accountable?
  • What governance structure ensures that the standards being developed are independent of the financial interests of the people developing them?
  • Who benefits financially when payers adopt CASP's accreditation as a network requirement?
  • Why does the same organization that stewards the field's clinical guidelines simultaneously lobby against mandatory enforcement of those guidelines' frontline credentialing standards?
  • What happens to independent, community-based providers — and the families they serve — when compliance costs are set by executives of large organizations whose operational realities bear no resemblance to a community-based practice?

From documenting the governance problem to building the alternative.

The original question remains: who gets to set standards for ABA, under what authority, and with what accountability? Since launch, the work has expanded from documenting CASP's structure to identifying what payers and public programs can require now — without creating another private gatekeeper.

CMS has now put ABA oversight squarely on the table

  • The August 2026 State Medicaid & CHIP ABA Toolkit addresses clinical standards, outcomes, provider qualifications, ownership, accreditation, utilization management, and program integrity.
  • It gives states a concrete federal framework for examining the very governance and quality questions this project has been raising.
  • The Project is mapping where CMS recommendations are evidence-backed, where they rely on private standards, and where stronger safeguards are needed.

A payer brief now turns critique into action

  • What Payers Already Have Authority to Require in ABA Provider Contracts identifies safeguards that can be implemented through ordinary credentialing and contracting authority.
  • The goal is targeted accountability: distinguish high-risk practices from ethical providers instead of imposing the same burden on the entire field.
  • Independent governance, beneficial-ownership disclosure, clinical control, credentialed staffing, and intensity-tiered oversight are all addressed.

The federal government has now documented the gap

  • CMS reports that between 2021 and 2025 the number of children with an autism diagnosis receiving ABA services rose 189%, while spending on ABA rose 421% — from $1.94 billion to $10.1 billion.
  • Applying those same figures, spending per child receiving ABA rose roughly 80%, while CMS separately reports weekly service hours per child rose 22%. Those calculations show a disproportion; they do not establish its cause.
  • CMS states that no ABA-specific quality measurements exist, and that accreditation is not a proxy for quality — in the same document that directs states toward accreditation.

Outcome measurement is the next standards question

  • The Project is cataloging what ABA quality and outcome measures actually exist, what they measure, and whether they are validated for the decisions being made with them.
  • That includes payer measures, Medicaid requirements, and accreditation standards.
  • Funding and working-group provenance are being documented separately from scientific validity. A structural conflict signal is not proof that a measure is biased.

The field is responding

  • 51 verified endorsements are now on file.
  • 18 signatories are public, 7 disclose credentials only, and 26 are anonymous.
  • The mix includes clinicians, practice owners, researchers, a physician, students, and other field stakeholders.

See the current signatories →

What this is — and what it is not

What this is not

  • A condemnation of CASP's existence or of the individuals who work within it in good faith
  • Opposition to quality standards in ABA services — we support them deeply
  • A competitive grievance from providers who dislike regulation
  • A claim that everyone involved in CASP has acted with bad intentions

What this is

  • A question of governance, democratic authority, and accountability
  • A review of how standards are being created — and whose interests they structurally serve
  • A call for the field's legitimate professional bodies to exercise the independent voice their constituencies need
  • A documented argument that the field deserves governance structures that match those of every comparable healthcare profession

Who this matters to

Independent Clinicians & Small Providers

  • Standards that govern your practice may be set without your input or representation
  • Compliance costs may be designed for organizations with compliance departments — not clinical teams
  • Accreditation requirements lobbied for in your name may disproportionately burden your practice

Payers & Regulators

  • Coverage and network decisions may rely on standards developed by a non-independent body
  • The accreditation body being promoted as a quality benchmark is owned by the trade association whose members it accredits
  • CASP's governance structure may not meet the independence standards typically applied to clinical standards bodies

Professional Organizations

  • Scientific and credentialing authority built by the field's legitimate bodies may be borrowed and applied without endorsement
  • Silence on these questions may be read by payers and regulators as implicit validation
  • The field's practitioner membership body was founded specifically to provide the independent voice CASP cannot

Families & Caregivers

  • Advocacy conducted in the field's name may not reflect independent clinical perspectives
  • Credentialing requirements designed to protect the quality of care your family receives may be actively opposed by the same organization setting clinical standards
  • You deserve to know the governance structure of the organizations shaping the services your family receives

A governance question the field deserves to examine

CASP was not authorized to represent the field

No election. No nomination process. No field-wide consent.

  • CASP originated in 2009 when leaders from ten provider agencies convened privately
  • It was not created through any democratic or representative process
  • No practitioners outside the founding group were asked to vote on CASP's authority
  • It formally incorporated as a 501(c)(6) trade association in 2015. The trade-association structure is ordinary; the governance issue is that CASP's constituency is provider organizations, while its public claims and policy influence extend to the broader “autism provider community,” including people and providers who are not members and did not authorize CASP to speak for them.

CASP is entitled to advocate for its members. It is not entitled to have that advocacy mistaken for the consensus of clinicians, scientists, consumers, or the profession.

Its governance structure creates unavoidable conflicts of interest

Every major decision is made by those who benefit from it.

  • The board is composed entirely of executives of its own member organizations
  • These organizations receive direct financial benefits from the decisions their executives make on CASP's board, including:
    • Accreditation standards they help design
    • Reimbursement policies they lobby payers to adopt
    • Network requirements that favor organizations at their scale
  • Independent governance bodies in medicine, dentistry, and psychology are specifically structured to prevent this

Those setting the standards are the same organizations financially impacted by them.

It owns the accreditation systems it promotes — and lobbies for them to be required

  • CASP created the Autism Commission on Quality (ACQ) as a wholly-owned subsidiary in 2022
  • It has successfully lobbied more than a dozen payer entities to require ACQ accreditation as a network participation condition
  • In December 2025, it acquired Jade Health — adding a second accreditation program (BHCOE) and a national patient data registry
  • Providers must pay fees to a subsidiary of the same trade association whose member organizations they compete with

The same entity that promotes the standard benefits from its adoption.

CASP's own CEO publicly acknowledged that ACQ "wouldn't have been able to make ends meet" without CASP's direct financial support — and ACQ's own accreditation manual states that it receives financial, staffing, and in-kind support from CASP — meaning the dependency is structural, not historical. The accreditation body CASP lobbies payers to require cannot sustain itself without the trade association whose members it accredits.

It promotes guidelines while opposing their frontline enforcement

The credentialing double standard.

CASP stewards and promotes the BACB's ABA Practice Guidelines as the clinical foundation of its authority. Yet on its own advocacy page, CASP explicitly identifies mandatory RBT enrollment requirements as a named policy barrier — one it deployed lobbyists to defeat in Indiana Medicaid.

At the federal level, CASP advocates for employment classifications broad enough to bill for services delivered by uncredentialed staff, preserving maximum labor flexibility for large provider organizations.

CASP invokes BACB credibility when it confers authority — and works against BACB standards when they create compliance costs.

"CASP represents the autism provider community to the nation at large including government, payers, and the general public."

— casproviders.org (Official Website)

"In 2009, leaders from 10 provider agencies convened in Las Vegas as the Council on Autism Services. The goal of this group was to provide a forum for senior executives from like-minded organizations to meet, share ideas, and solve problems."

— casproviders.org/history-and-mission

"The founders of CASP recognized the need for a strong national voice for autism service providers. While there are successful associations representing parents and self-advocates, the priorities of these groups may not always align with the needs of provider agencies."

— casproviders.org/history-and-mission

CASP's CEO publicly acknowledged in early 2026 that ACQ "wouldn't have been able to make ends meet" without CASP's direct financial support. ACQ's own accreditation manual states that it shares CASP's tax status and receives financial, staffing, and in-kind support from CASP. An accreditation body's core function is the ability to withhold approval. This one depends on the association representing the organizations it evaluates for its funding, its staff, and its tax status.

— CASP CEO, Public Statement, 2026 · ACQ Standards and Guide (v1.0)

Eight structural concerns the field deserves to examine

Each of the following is documented in CASP's own public materials, its leadership's public statements, and peer-reviewed research. All sources are cited in the full position statement.

01 — Democratic Legitimacy

No field-wide authorization was ever sought

CASP began in 2009 when leaders from ten provider agencies convened privately and decided to represent the field. No field-wide nomination process occurred. No practitioners outside the founding group were asked to vote on CASP's authority. The organization that now lobbies federal agencies on the field's behalf was never authorized by that field to do so.

02 — Governance Structure

The board governs standards its own organizations operate under

Every member of CASP's Board of Directors simultaneously holds an executive role at a CASP member organization. Every standard set, every accreditation criterion established, every policy lobbied for — decided by executives whose organizations receive direct financial benefits from those very decisions.

03 — Accreditation Ownership

CASP owns what it lobbies payers to require — and its own finances prove why that matters

CASP created ACQ as a wholly-owned subsidiary in 2022, then successfully lobbied payers to require ACQ accreditation for network participation. Every accredited organization pays fees to a subsidiary of the same trade association whose member organizations compete for the same contracts.

ACQ's own accreditation manual states that it shares CASP's tax status and receives financial, staffing, and in-kind support from CASP, and CASP's CEO has publicly said ACQ could not have made ends meet without that support. Think of it this way: the inspector is on the payroll of the company being inspected. When the inspector's continued existence depends on that company's money, the inspection cannot be trusted — regardless of anyone's intentions.

04 — Credentialing Inconsistency

Promotes guidelines while opposing their frontline enforcement

CASP promotes and monetizes the BACB's ABA Practice Guidelines as the foundation of its clinical authority. Yet on its own advocacy page, CASP identifies mandatory RBT enrollment requirements as a policy barrier it deployed lobbyists to defeat — borrowing BACB credibility when it confers authority, opposing BACB standards when they create cost. The BACB transferred those guidelines to CASP in 2020, apparently without stipulations on their use.

05 — Representation Gap

Governance reflects large-organization priorities

Even the nine largest providers account for less than 30% of industry revenue — the remainder is distributed across independent and community-based practices. Yet independent clinicians and small providers have no meaningful governance representation. Accreditation requirements are scaled for organizations with compliance departments, not independent clinical teams. The National Restaurant Association represents restaurant owners — it does not claim to set standards for the professionals who work in those restaurants or speak for the people they serve. CASP claims all three.

06 — Missing Protections

ABA lacks the structural safeguards every comparable field built before capital arrived

Medicine built the Corporate Practice of Medicine doctrine — in 33 states, practices must be owned by licensed clinicians, not investors. Dentistry and psychology built equivalent protections. Hospital accreditation is handled by The Joint Commission, an independent nonprofit with consumer and clinician representation — not owned by a trade association. Between 2017–2022, private equity firms completed 85% of all M&A in ABA services. Every comparable field built these structures before this level of outside capital entered. ABA has not yet built them — and the organization claiming to speak for the field has actively opposed the provider enrollment requirements that verify frontline practitioners hold the credentials the field's own credentialing body requires.

07 — Commercial Ecosystem

Access to the standards process is paid for at every level

CASP operates four paid tiers. Provider organizations pay annual dues. Business vendors pay $5,000 per year. University training programs pay up to $2,000 per year. Allied organizations pay $800 per year. Each tier receives access to the Special Interest Groups and workgroups where CASP's clinical standards are developed.

The training affiliate program creates a documented pipeline routing the next generation of practitioners toward CASP member organizations. Allied affiliates must formally endorse the services CASP member organizations provide as a condition of eligibility. CASP's board determines which organizations are "direct competitors" and therefore ineligible. It is a commercial strategy operating under clinical cover.

08 — Financial Conflicts

The organization's own tax filings document what its governance structure enables

CASP's 2024 IRS Form 990 — a public document — shows total revenue of $2,593,034 and CEO compensation of $266,054. The national median salary for behavior analysts is approximately $89,000. The CEO of the organization claiming to represent those practitioners earns approximately three times their median salary.

The same filing discloses a related party transaction in which CASP paid $16,550 to an organization run by the CEO's spouse for rent and services. This was properly disclosed, as required. What it illustrates is structural: every financial decision is overseen by a board composed entirely of its own member organizations' executives, with no independent check.

The stakes depend on who you are

The same governance questions have different implications depending on your role in this ecosystem.

Questions payers should ask before adopting CASP's standards

Before granting any organization's accreditation or standards the status of a coverage condition or quality benchmark, payers are well-served to apply a basic governance test: is the standards-setting body governed by a board that is independent of the financial beneficiaries of those standards? Were the standards developed through a transparent, multi-stakeholder process that included clinicians, families, and researchers? Is the accreditation body structurally independent from the trade association whose members it accredits?

These are the same governance tests applied to standards bodies in medicine, dentistry, and every other healthcare field. They are reasonable to apply here.

Questions worth asking before you decide

  • Who sits on CASP's board, and what is each member's direct financial relationship to the standards they are setting?
  • Why did CASP's own CEO state publicly that ACQ "wouldn't have been able to make ends meet" without CASP's direct financial support — and what has changed structurally since, given that ACQ's own manual still states it depends on CASP for funding, staffing, and tax status?
  • What independent body verified the clinical validity of ACQ accreditation criteria before payers began adopting them as network requirements?
  • Why does the same organization that administers accreditation also own the data registry used to measure network adequacy?
  • What happens to independent and community-based providers — often the only ABA access point in underserved areas — if they cannot absorb the compounding costs of CASP's compliance requirements?

What state regulators may want to examine

CASP employs federal and state lobbyists, conducts annual advocacy events in Washington D.C., and has successfully lobbied for mandated recognition of its subsidiary's accreditation in over a dozen payer contracts. Its documented opposition to RBT provider enrollment requirements in Indiana Medicaid raises a direct question about the alignment between CASP's advocacy positions and the consumer protection mechanisms states have put in place.

When CASP argues against mandatory RBT enrollment requirements, it is opposing the mechanism by which states verify that the individuals billing for services hold the training and supervision the field's own credentialing body requires.

Regulatory questions that warrant review

  • Are IRS private benefit rules for 501(c)(6) organizations being appropriately applied given the concentration of financial benefit flowing to CASP's own member organizations from its standards and accreditation activities?
  • What formal governance requirements should apply to any trade association seeking regulatory authority over clinical standards for a vulnerable population?
  • What is the downstream impact of CASP's accreditation requirements on the survival of independent, community-based providers in payer networks?
  • Should ABA services be subject to ownership and control protections analogous to those other healthcare fields have constructed to limit investor influence over clinical decisions?

Why independent clinicians and small providers should care — and speak up

The standards being developed and lobbied for in the name of the field were shaped by executives of large provider organizations — for the operational realities of organizations at that scale. The compliance infrastructure CASP's accreditation requires is built for organizations with dedicated compliance departments. For an independent BCBA or small practice, meeting those requirements means diverting clinical time to administrative overhead or absorbing costs the practice cannot sustain.

APBA was founded specifically to represent credentialed individual practitioners. Your professional body exists. The question is whether its voice is being heard — and whether yours is behind it.

What you can do right now

  • Endorse this statement — publicly, by credential only, or anonymously. Every verified endorsement demonstrates that CASP does not speak for the entire field.
  • Share the public-use letters with trusted colleagues who may not yet be aware of these governance concerns.
  • Contact your state's insurance commissioner and professional licensing board directly.
  • Reach out to BACB, APBA, and ABAI and ask what they are doing in response to CASP's growing institutional footprint.
  • Document your own experience with CASP-driven accreditation costs and compliance burdens — that documentation matters.

What the field's legitimate governance bodies are being asked to consider

The authority to define clinical and ethical standards in applied behavior analysis belongs to the credentialing and scientific bodies of this field. The BACB credentials its practitioners. ABAI convenes its science. APBA represents its professional membership. None of these bodies appointed CASP to speak for the field or endorsed its accreditation subsidiary as the quality benchmark for ABA services.

This statement asks each of these organizations to examine, formally and publicly, what CASP's growing institutional authority means for the integrity of the standards they exist to protect — and to exercise the independent voice their constituencies need them to use.

Specific requests to professional bodies

  • BACB: Formally review how the ABA Practice Guidelines are being used by CASP — including whether CASP's documented opposition to mandatory RBT enrollment is consistent with the consumer protection purpose for which those guidelines were developed — and account publicly for the 2020 transfer and its terms.
  • ABAI: Publicly clarify that CASP's standards and accreditation programs do not carry ABAI's scientific endorsement, and that payers and federal agencies should not interpret CASP's advocacy positions as reflecting the scientific consensus of the field.
  • APBA: Recognize that APBA's founding purpose — giving credentialed individual practitioners an independent voice — is most necessary when large corporate providers and independent practitioners have competing interests. Confirm that APBA retains full policy independence from CASP's commercial and lobbying interests, and exercise that voice.

Read the full statement. Share the letters.

Claims are grounded in public source material: organizational publications, government guidance and dockets, publicly filed financial records, peer-reviewed research, and leadership statements. Source trails are published so readers can verify the record directly.

New — August 2026

Payer Brief: What Payers Already Have Authority to Require

A practical contracting framework for clinical control, credentialed staffing, ownership disclosure, site verification, intensity-tiered oversight, and independent accreditation governance — without waiting for new legislation.

Read the Payer Work →

Full Position Statement

Governance, Accountability, and the Question of Authority in ABA

The complete statement covering CASP's origin, governance structure, accreditation ownership, credentialing inconsistencies, the private equity context, and what independent governance should actually look like.

Read Full Statement →

Letter — Professional Body

Letter to the BACB

Asks the BACB to account for a specific contradiction: the organization it transferred its ABA Practice Guidelines to in 2020 is simultaneously lobbying against mandatory provider enrollment requirements for RBTs — the mechanism by which payers verify that frontline practitioners hold the BACB's own credential for that role — and to examine whether that transfer has served the consumer protection purpose those guidelines were developed to fulfill.

Read & Download →

Letter — Professional Body

Letter to APBA

Calls on APBA — founded specifically to give credentialed individual practitioners an independent voice — to examine whether its growing entanglement with CASP has compromised that independence, and to exercise the practitioner representation that is its founding purpose and its members' primary reason for belonging.

Read & Download →

Letter — Professional Body

Letter to ABAI

Asks ABAI to clarify publicly that CASP's standards do not carry ABAI's scientific endorsement — and that payers and federal agencies should not interpret CASP's advocacy as reflecting the scientific consensus of the field.

Read & Download →

These are field versions of the institutional letters — adapted so any credentialed practitioner, family member, or concerned citizen can send them directly. Fill in your name and credentials, and send.

This is documented fact.
Here is who is saying it — and why.

Who prepared this

This project was prepared by Kirstin Hall, MS, BCBA, IBA, CCM, a behavior analyst in private practice in San Diego, CA, with over 23 years of experience in the field. The decision to attach her name to formal institutional letters — to the BACB, ABAI, and APBA — while others contributing remain anonymous reflects a deliberate choice: someone needed to be willing to be named. She chose to be named.

The concerns documented here are shared by credentialed ABA providers, educators, and field stakeholders who have chosen not to be publicly identified at this time. Members of this field have reported concerns about professional retaliation for public criticism of CASP. Those concerns are taken seriously here. The anonymity of contributors is not a weakness in this argument — it is evidence of the exact power dynamic this project is documenting.

Who is actually speaking for the field?

CASP paid their CEO $266,054 in total compensation in 2024 — approximately three to four times the median salary of the behavior analysts it claims to represent. Several board members hold no clinical credentials in applied behavior analysis whatsoever. The people writing the rules for how ABA services should be delivered are not the clinicians who deliver them, the educators who train the next generation of practitioners, the families who receive them, or the researchers who developed the science behind them.

CASP is a trade association for autism service organizations. There is nothing inherently improper about that; businesses need associations that advocate for their interests, just as individual professionals need organizations that represent theirs. The problem begins when those categories are collapsed. CASP's board consists of executives of member provider organizations, and its institutional constituency is the businesses that employ clinicians and deliver services. Those organizations can have legitimate interests — operational efficiency, workforce flexibility, reimbursement, network access, accreditation requirements — that are not identical to the professional obligations or interests of an individual BCBA, RBT, researcher, family, or nonmember provider. CASP can legitimately speak for its member organizations. It should not be treated as though that is the same thing as speaking for all autism service providers or for the ABA profession itself.

On the use of AI

AI was used as a writing and editing tool to help organize and articulate arguments that are entirely the product of human research, analysis, and professional experience. Every claim in this statement was identified, verified, and sourced by the humans behind this project. AI made the writing cleaner. It did not generate the concerns, the evidence, or the argument.

If your response to this project is to focus on the tool rather than the documented facts — you are choosing deflection over substance.

On accreditation — the concept is not the problem

We are not arguing that organizational accreditation in ABA is wrong. The field needs quality standards. The problem is structural: an accreditation body should be governed by an independent board with clinical, scientific, and consumer representation — not owned outright by the trade association whose members are being evaluated. Every comparable profession built that separation deliberately. ACQ's concept is valid. Its governance is not.

On "ABA is a new field"

ABA has been practiced for more than 60 years. It has been insurance-mandated in all 50 states since 2020. The BACB has credentialed practitioners since 1998. Private equity firms completed 85 percent of all mergers and acquisitions in autism services between 2017 and 2022. The field was apparently mature enough to attract billions in investment. It is mature enough to govern itself.

Calling ABA too young for independent governance is not an argument. It is a delay tactic that benefits the organizations already filling the vacuum.

On who authorized us to raise these concerns

No one, and we are not claiming any. Neither did any organization currently shaping these standards receive a field-wide mandate. Any credentialed professional has the right to document publicly available facts and ask that professional bodies examine them. We are not claiming authority to speak for the field. We are claiming the right to ask who does — and whether that authority was ever legitimately granted.

What the field needs now

This is not a campaign against CASP's existence. The field desperately needs quality standards — rigorous, enforceable, meaningful ones. But the field should determine them. Not a trade association whose governance structure concentrates decision-making in the hands of executives of its own member organizations, with no structural requirement for frontline clinical experience and no independent voice for the practitioners, educators, and families who actually deliver and receive care.

The organizations that could build legitimate governance already exist. ABAI holds the science. The BACB holds the credentialing infrastructure. APBA was founded to hold the practitioner voice. The field does not lack for governance models — it lacks the organizational will to activate the legitimate bodies it already has before the question of who speaks for the field is settled by default rather than by choice.

Endorse the statement

This statement belongs to everyone who signs it.

Endorsements are accepted from credentialed behavior analysts, ABA providers of any size, researchers, educators, family members, and concerned citizens who believe the governance of ABA services should be independent, transparent, and accountable to the field it claims to represent.

You choose your level of disclosure. Your identity is verified by the coordinating author before your endorsement is published. Requests for anonymity are honored without question — they do not diminish the weight of your endorsement.

If you have professional concerns about retaliation, choose the anonymous option. Members of this field have reported concerns about professional retaliation for public criticism of CASP. Anonymity in that context is not cowardice — it is rational self-protection, and it is exactly the power dynamic this statement is documenting.

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Full Public Name, credentials, organization, and state listed publicly on the statement
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Credential Only Name and professional credentials listed; organization and location withheld
○
Anonymous Verified privately; listed only as "[Credential] — Independent Provider, [State]"

Your email will not be published. It is used solely to verify your endorsement before it is listed on the statement.

✓

Endorsement Received

Your submission has been received and will be verified before appearing on the statement. A confirmation will be sent to your email.

The March statement is locked. The work after it isn't.

The March 2026 Position Statement remains exactly as issued. New findings, corrections, correspondence, payer work, accreditation analysis, workforce questions, and media activity are recorded separately by date so the Project can evolve without rewriting what people originally reviewed and endorsed.

August 15 · Public materials refreshed

Public payer and institutional outreach templates were aligned with the Project’s current representation, quality-measurement, accreditation, and conflict-of-interest framing.

August 14 · Representation clarified

The issue is not that CASP is a trade association. Provider-business representation is simply not interchangeable with practitioner, scientific, consumer, or field-wide consensus.

August 2026 · CMS & payer work

The Project is translating federal oversight findings into concrete payer and public-program safeguards while keeping working research tools separate from finished public products.

July 15 · Rad N Bad Episode 43

The Project joined a long-form discussion of governance, private equity, accreditation, and the question of who is authorized to speak for ABA.

See all Project Updates →

From individual letters to broader scrutiny.

The Project already contacted the major professional bodies directly. Rather than asking supporters to repeat those requests through another letter campaign, the next institutional step under consideration is broader professional and scientific scrutiny — including a potential multi-author call-to-action paper. The original correspondence remains preserved as a dated record.

View the correspondence record →